Following the conclusion the Olympic Games, it is worth remembering that arbitration is not only one of the most efficient, flexible, and adaptable methods of conflict resolution, but it can also appropriately resolve a wide variety of factual and legal conflicts.
There is no better example of this variety than in the realm of sports arbitration, as demonstrated by the case between the Russian Olympic Committee (ROC) v. the International Olympic Committee (IOC).[1]
Facts of the case
In October 2023, the International Olympic Committee (“IOC”) issued a decision (“Decision”) concerning Russia’s incorporation of Donetsk, Kherson, Lugansk, and Zaporozhye (“Regions”) into the Russian Olympic Committee (“ROC”). This action followed Russia’s formal recognition and annexation of these regions, which had been widely condemned internationally. The IOC viewed this incorporation as a breach of the jurisdiction of the National Olympic Committee (“NOC”) of Ukraine, as protected by the Olympic Charter (“Charter”) and determined that “violates the territorial integrity of the NOC of Ukraine.” Consequently, it suspended the ROC with immediate effect until further notice and barred the ROC from participating in the 2024 Paris Olympics. ROC appealed the Decision to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”).
The arguments before the CAS
1. Is this dispute a matter of international law?
One of ROC’s arguments was that the IOC (and the CAS) did not have jurisdiction to decide this dispute because the delineation of a country’s “limits” (such as whether the Regions were a part of Russia or not) is a matter of public international law, which falls outside the jurisdiction of the IOC and the CAS. The CAS rejected this argument as irrelevant and missing the point of the dispute, as the case did not concern the legitimacy of Russia’s annexation of the Regions under public international law.
Rather, the CAS emphasized that the IOC is a private, autonomous entity governed by Swiss law, which is free to establish its own rules, including those defining the territorial jurisdiction of an NOC it recognizes. The IOC is regulated by its Charter, which does not grant it the authority to resolve territorial disputes but does empower it to define what constitutes a “country” for the purposes of participation in the Olympics.
For the CAS, the “limits” of a “country” can be determined under the IOC Charter as a matter of private law, and the IOC can therefore make issue rulings and make decisions concerning sanctions.
2. Rules 28.5 and 30.1 of the Charter
The ROC also argued that Rules 28.5[2] and 30.1[3] of the Charter (invoked by the IOC in the Decision) does not confer upon the IOC the authority to decide on the “limits” of the jurisdiction of NOCs. Rule 30.1 refers to territories not recognized by the international community as independent states (e.g., the Faroe Islands), but the ROC claimed that this rule is inapplicable to the Regions at issue. Rule 28.5 implies that an NOC cannot exercise jurisdiction outside the sovereign state to which it belongs, but the ROC argued that the Rule does not address the “limits” of a country according to international recognition. The ROC further argued that if these Rules were ambiguous, the principle of contra proferentem required that ambiguity to be resolved against the IOC as the drafter of the Charter.
The CAS rejected these arguments, asserting that Rule 28.5 defines the territorial jurisdiction of an NOC as coinciding with the geographic boundaries of the country where it is established. Rule 30.1 defines a “country” as an “independent state recognized by the international community.” Read together, the CAS found the text to be clear: if the international community recognizes the Regions as part of Ukraine, then the ROC cannot admit sports organizations from these Regions as its members. It also dismissed the ROC’s backup argument that the concept of the “international community” was ambiguous and therefore did not apply the principle of contra proferentem.
3. Double standard by the IOC?
The ROC cited its incorporation of Crimea and Sevastopol as its members in 2016, to which neither the IOC nor the Ukrainian NOC raised objections, even though the international community did not recognize these regions as Russian. The ROC argued that the IOC’s decision to sanction the ROC in this instance imposed a double standard.
The CAS stated that for the IOC’s previous practice to be considered binding as a matter of law, it must reach a level of “Observanz”, which had not been achieved in this case. Additionally, the CAS rejected the analogy between 2016 and 2024, noting that in 2016 the IOC was not informed of the ROC’s inclusion of these regions, and the Ukrainian NOC did not challenge it either.
The ROC attempted to invoke CAS jurisprudence applying the principle of equality in sports law, which holds that “similar cases must be treated similarly, but dissimilar cases could be treated differently.”[4] The ROC cited various historical cases in support of its argument.
The CAS again rejected these analogies, noting that those cases did not involve NOCs extending their jurisdiction over another NOC’s area or beyond their own jurisdiction. Therefore, unlike in those cases, the IOC could legitimately impose sanctions against the ROC in this situations. The CAS ultimately found no evidence of a “double standard” by the IOC.
4. Disproportionality? Not even close
Finally, the CAS rejected the claim that the sanctions against the ROC were disproportionate and exceeded what was “reasonably required.”
First, while acknowledging that the Principles of Olympism require political neutrality in sports organizations, this obligation does not overrule the IOC’s requirement that NOCs not interfere in or with another NOC’s territorial jurisdiction, which is what the ROC had done in the case at hand.
Second, the CAS dismissed the ROC’s argument that the measure was not “necessary” to protect the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian NOC, as the ROC contended that it had no influence on the armed conflict. The CAS noted that the sanction was not meant to address the armed conflict but rather was designed to remedy the inclusion of Ukrainian organizations in the ROC, which violated the IOC Charter.
Third, the CAS rejected the ROC’s position that the suspension was disproportionate because the ROC believed that the suspension’s effects on the ROC and its athletes were not justified by the interest in protecting the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian NOC. The CAS refuted this point by noting that, in 2023, athletes with Russian passports were allowed to compete as neutrals. Similarly, it dismissed ROC’s arguments based on the human right to participate in sports.
Fourth, the CAS did not accept that the sanction was disproportionate simply because it was effective “until further notice” (without an expiration date). Under Rule 59, which sets out the list of sanctions, the CAS interpreted the IOC’s measure to be the least “intrusive” sanction to address the serious violation of the Charter by the ROC, and in any case may be less severe than other deadlines, such as the sanction “remaining in place until the dispute between Russia and Ukraine was resolved.”
Finally, the CAS rejected the ROC’s appeal.
Concluding remarks
The ROC case shows the role of sports arbitration in resolving disputes with delicate interests at stake, while properly abstaining from resolving issues outside its jurisdiction. In particular, the CAS refrained from interfering in territorial matters of public international law while still establishing what constitutes the “limits” of a “country” according to the Charter for its application.
Particularly, this case reinforces the importance of CAS as an international body specialized in the efficient resolution of sports disputes, and sports arbitration as a mechanism that “offers many of the same advantages as arbitration in commercial disputes: neutral setting, adaptable procedures, specialized arbitrators, etc.”[5]
[1] CAS Case 2023/A/10093, Russian Olympic Committee (ROC) v. International Olympic Committee (IOC), Award, 23 February 2024.
[2]Rule 28.5 establishes: “[t]he area of jurisdiction of an NOC must coincide with the limits of the country in which it is established and has its headquarters” (Olympic Charter, International Olympic Committee, in force as from 15 October 2023).
[3]Rule 30.1 reads as follows: “[i]n the Olympic Charter, the expression ‘country’ means an independent State recognised by the international community” (Olympic Charter, International Olympic Committee, in force as from 15 October 2023).
[4]CAS Case 2020/A/6745, Vujovik v. Andijon Futbol Sport PFK & FIFA, 4 February 2020, para. 90.
[5]GIRSBERGER, D., VOSER, D., International Arbitration: Comparative and Swiss Perspectives, Fourth Edition, Schulthess Juristische Medien AG 2021, p. 615.
